Global trade remains firmly in its era of managed instability. The EU has put last year’s tariff confrontation with Donald Trump on a more predictable footing and accelerated its push for new trade agreements, but pressure from US protectionism, as well as Chinese overcapacity and export controls, continues. At the same time, Brussels is becoming more comfortable deploying tariffs, safeguards, and economic-security tools of its own. With several of these strands set to converge in the autumn, what should be on your radar for the rentrée? 

Tariff peace, trade pressure 

One year after the Turnberry agreement, the immediate threat of an EU-US trade war has receded, but the relationship is far from settled. Both sides have broadly delivered on their headline tariff commitments: the EU has eliminated its remaining tariffs on US industrial goods and provided preferential access for selected agricultural and seafood products, while Washington has largely kept tariffs on EU exports within the agreed ceiling. 

The glaring exception remains steel and aluminium, where US tariffs remain at 50%. Little progress has been made on the promised arrangement to ring-fence the two markets from global overcapacity, making this an obvious source of tension heading into year-end. EU legislation implementing Turnberry allows the Commission to suspend concessions if Washington continues to impose tariffs above 15% on EU steel and aluminium derivative products after 31 December. 

More broadly, the transatlantic dispute is shifting from tariffs towards regulatory barriers. Washington continues to criticise EU rules on corporate due diligence, deforestation, CBAM, methane emissions, and food safety, as well as the digital toolbox. On top of the existing legislation, upcoming EU measures, such as the Industrial Accelerator Act and changes to public procurement rules, could create new friction by favouring European production. 

If the US relationship has stabilised, China could reach a more acute moment of confrontation this autumn. The new EU-China Trade and Investment Consultations are meant to produce progress by October on trade imbalances, market access, export controls, and intellectual property. The 15–16 October European Council could then coincide with the moment for the Commission to present a wider package of China measures, with von der Leyen potentially signalling the direction in her 16 September State of the Union address. 

The immediate test will be trade defence. The Commission is increasingly concerned that duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles are being undermined by a surge in plug-in hybrid imports. Brussels could either open a new anti-subsidy investigation, legally safer but slower, or pursue an anti-circumvention case, which could produce duties much faster but would be harder to defend according to WTO rules. 

Rare earths give Beijing leverage in the other direction. European industry remains highly exposed to Chinese supplies, while some of Beijing’s export-control restrictions remain in place. In theory, this sets up an October escalation point. In practice, Brussels may still seek an off-ramp through limited Chinese market-opening commitments or easier access to critical minerals. 

The diversification test 

With relations with Washington and Beijing increasingly difficult, trade diversification has become a core part of the EU’s economic-security strategy. The Commission argues that new agreements can help compensate for weaker exports to the US while reducing reliance on the EU’s largest trading partners. 

There has already been significant movement. The EU-Mercosur agreement began applying provisionally on 1 May, while negotiations with India concluded in January and the agreement is undergoing legal revision. Indonesia should be the next southeast Asian agreement to advance towards application. 

Attention this autumn will increasingly turn to the next wave of negotiations. Thailand is the strongest candidate for another breakthrough: 17 chapters have been provisionally concluded and both sides are targeting completion by the end of 2026. Agriculture, SPS rules, and Thailand’s services and investment offer remain the main obstacles. 

Talks with the Philippines are also advanced, particularly on digital trade and regulatory chapters, although tariffs, services, investment, and procurement remain unresolved. Malaysia is further behind, with negotiators only now moving into sensitive areas including palm oil, motor vehicles, halal certification, and market access. The next round in September should show whether talks can move beyond the easier technical chapters. 

The UAE offers a less positive picture. Brussels believes Abu Dhabi has yet to make sufficient concessions on procurement, export restrictions, services, investment, and sustainability, while sanctions circumvention remains a concern for several Member States. The wider picture is therefore mixed: Thailand could provide the next headline agreement, while the Philippines is progressing steadily, Malaysia faces tougher bargaining and the UAE remains far more uncertain.  

Open trade, harder edges 

At home, EU trade policy is also becoming more defensive. A new steel regime has replaced the previous safeguard, sharply reducing tariff-free import volumes and imposing a 50% duty above quota. The Commission is already assessing whether its product coverage should be widened.  

Economic security is moving in the same direction. The revised foreign investment screening framework strengthens and harmonises national systems, while the Commission is reviewing the Dual-Use Regulation amid a broader debate over export controls and sensitive technologies.  

Customs reform has meanwhile moved from negotiation towards implementation following a political agreement between the institutions. Attention will increasingly turn to the future EU Customs Authority and Data Hub, alongside the overhaul of rules for low-value e-commerce imports.  

The EU will also continue defending its climate and sustainability legislation from international criticism. CBAM entered its definitive phase this year and Brussels is already working to extend it to selected downstream products and tighten anti-circumvention rules. The Deforestation Regulation remains particularly sensitive in negotiations with trading partners, while US pressure over CSDDD and other environmental measures is unlikely to disappear.  

Finally, the multilateral backdrop remains weak. March’s WTO ministerial conference failed to restore momentum to the organisation’s wider reform agenda, reinforcing Brussels’ shift towards bilateral agreements, plurilateral arrangements, and autonomous trade instruments. Sanctions will likewise remain part of the picture, with growing emphasis on enforcement and third-country circumvention.  

Taken together, the rentrée will test a European trade strategy that is becoming both more pragmatic and more defensive. Brussels now has to keep Turnberry intact as regulatory tensions grow, decide how far it is prepared to escalate with China, turn a crowded FTA pipeline into genuine diversification, and deploy a growing economic-security toolbox without undermining its claim to remain an open trading power. How successfully it reconciles those objectives will shape EU trade policy well beyond 2026. 

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