Introduction
On 4 November, the European Commission High Representative and Vice President Kaja Kallas, and the Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, presented the “2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy”. Each autumn the European Commission delivers a detailed assessment of progress by EU candidates and potential candidates. This includes the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, and Türkiye, together with recommendations on their reform priorities.
EU accession is a long, technical process, as every major step requires the unanimous backing of all EU Member States. Accession negotiations are structured around 35 policy areas, or chapters, which are grouped into clusters.
Rule of law conditionality
Since the most recent accession of Croatia in 2013, the enlargement process has remained relatively frozen, but it gained new momentum throughout 2023 and 2024. Accession is a merit-based process, assessed on objective progress against the Copenhagen criteria, which include:
- Stable institutions that can guarantee democracy, Rule of law, Human Rights and the protection of minorities;
- Functioning market economy and the ability to cope with the competitive pressure of the EU market and inclusive growth;
- Ability to take on the obligations of EU membership, including the capacity to implement all EU law and adhere to the aims of the Union including the green Agenda and sustainable connectivity;
Since the rule of law was put into the EU enlargement policy, its role within conditionality has steadily grown to become cornerstone of the accession process. However, while EU leaders insist that enlargement is a priority, lack of progress on the rule of law among applicants undermines the process.
The geopolitical importance of Enlargement
Last year, President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen said geopolitical challenges have strengthened Europe’s unity of purpose and that Europeans need to do a lot more to protect their own security and prosperity – though that unity isn’t always on display in co-legislators. She also said this means defending European democratic values and addressing new global security challenges.
Amid geopolitical tensions, Eu Enlargement became the European Commission priority under shared democratic and rule-of-law standards.
The 2025 EU Enlargement Communication argues that geopolitical headwinds have reinforced Europe’s unity of purpose and the conviction that safeguarding security, prosperity, and democratic values requires working hand-in-hand with neighbours. Enlargement is framed as a key geopolitical tool: strict, fair, and merit-based, demanding lasting reforms that transform economies, institutions, and societies in line with the EU’s standards, rule of law, fundamental rights, and foreign policy alignment.
In parallel, it says the EU is helping partners meet the bar — strengthening institutions and public administration, accelerating gradual integration through Growth Plans and pre-accession participation in selected policies and programmes. Communication efforts are being stepped up to explain both benefits and challenges, while the next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034) and a new Global Europe Instrument are designed to underpin this trajectory.
Additionally, the adoption of the “European Parliament resolution on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations”, in the October Plenary session, calls on the Commission and the Council to clearly communicate the findings of the policy reviews and to develop, in cooperation with Parliament, a realistic, sequenced roadmap for implementing the necessary institutional reforms required by the enlargement process.
Analysis
Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhoods
Since early 2024 there have been eleven inter-governmental conferences (five with Albania, four with Montenegro, and one each with Ukraine and Moldova). More in detail:
- Montenegro has completed the screening process, opened 33 chapters and provisionally closed seven of them;
- Albania has opened negotiations in July 2022; since then, it has completed the screening process and opened five clusters;
- Moldova’s EU accession negotiations were opened in June 2024. Since then, Moldova has completed the screening process;
- North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations were opened in July 2022. Since then, North Macedonia has completed the screening process;
- Serbia’s EU accession negotiations were opened in June 2013. Since then, Serbia has completed the screening process, opened 22 chapters and provisionally closed two of them.
EU candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, Moldova have all made significant progress on key reforms that the EU considers essential for joining the bloc. In addition to the successful Economic and Investment Plans, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans with its €6 billion Reform & Growth Facility is incentivising reforms, with justice and the rule of law at the core.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations were opened in June 2024. Since then, Ukraine has completed the screening process.
At Euronews’ EU Enlargement Summit on November 4, 2025, EU leaders urged Hungary to lift its veto blocking Ukraine’s accession talks. European Council President António Costa pressed both candidates and Member States to make decisive choices on enlargement or risk being “trapped by painful historical legacies”, noting the push coincides with the Commission’s latest enlargement report.
Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos labelled the veto “not fair,” noted that Hungary had previously backed Ukraine’s candidacy, and said the Commission and Council are exploring ways to overcome the blockage.
The Ukraine Facility had mobilised €31.3 billion by 1 October 2025, with €22.7 billion disbursed as direct budget support, underpinning reforms, financing needs, and reconstruction. Integration with the Single Market progressed, notably with the “Roam like at home” decision entering into force on 1 January 2026
The work toward an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products was anticipated for 2026, alongside initiatives to embed Ukrainian industry in EU value chains.
Türkiye
Türkiye’s EU accession negotiations were opened in October 2005, and since then it has completed the screening process, opened 16 chapters and provisionally closed one of them.
Nonetheless, accession negotiations with the country have been at a standstill since 2018, in line with the decision of the Council. The EU’s 2025 assessment of Türkiye situates the relationship within wider strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Eurasian connectivity corridor. The EU seeks a stable, secure regional environment and a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye, underpinned by respect for international law, good-neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of EU Member States. At the same time, the EU still records serious setbacks in democratic standards.
Since early 2025 there has been a marked rise in legal action against elected officials, opposition figures and parties, activists, civil society and business representatives, and journalists, further shrinking civic space through sustained judicial and administrative pressure. However, the country made further progress on anti-trafficking efforts by strengthening legal, institutional, and operational frameworks to combat traffickers and support victims.
Macroeconomically, tight monetary policies curtailed domestic demand and shifted 2025 growth (3.3%) toward net exports. Bold policy measures began to turn the tide on inflation, but domestic political tensions triggered financial turmoil in spring 2025. Overall, while Türkiye’s geopolitical and geo-economic relevance to EU connectivity and regional stability has increased, the deterioration in the rule of law and fundamental rights remains a matter of considerable concern for the accession process and for the depth of EU–Türkiye cooperation.
An unfinished process
The path to EU accession remains long and technical — but it is no longer static; Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, and Kosovo have become potential candidates with accession negotiations not yet opened.
Kosovo, though a potential candidate with strong public support and full Common Foreign policy, saw reforms slow after divisive 2025 elections and delayed institution-building. Georgia has undergone severe democratic backsliding — repressive laws, politicised judiciary, pressure on critics — and, after refusing to pursue accession talks in November 2024, is treated as a candidate in name only; the EU has downgraded contacts, suspended assistance to authorities, and partially suspended visa facilitation. Bosnia and Herzegovina has seen few of the required reforms, but, in September 2025, submitted its Reform Agenda to the Commission for agreement.
