With new sanctions, legislative bans, and transatlantic pressure converging, the coming months will determine whether the EU can finally turn its “long goodbye” into a permanent break.

Three years into the war 

More than 1,328 days after Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, Europe has made major strides in cutting its reliance on Russian energy. Yet, the task is far from complete, EU countries are still sending billions to Moscow for gas, oil, and nuclear fuel, and, in some cases, spending more on Russian energy than on support for Ukraine.  

The United States has seized on these contradictions. President Trump and his administration have put the spotlight firmly on Europe’s remaining dependence, urging the EU to go further and faster. This pressure has not come from altruism. Washington has simultaneously pushed European governments to increase purchases of American energy – cemented in the August EU-US trade deal and the EU’s widely criticised pledge to import $750 billion worth of US energy by 2028.  

The Trump factor, combined with his erratic stance on Ukraine, from photo-ops with Putin in Alaska to more recent calls for harsher sanction, is shaping the debate in Brussels as much as Europe’s own internal politics. 

The current state of EU sanctions on Russian energy 

Since 2022, the EU has adopted 18 packages of sanctions, progressively expanding restrictions on Russia’s energy sector. These measures now touch nearly every part of trade: 

• Oil and petroleum products: The EU has banned imports of seaborne crude oil and petroleum products. Landlocked Member States without direct access to seaborne supply routes were granted exemptions. Czechia initially shared that exemption, but as of early 2025 it has voluntarily phased out Russian oil altogether. Hungary and Slovakia, by contrast, continue to make use of the derogation, with imports of Russian oil now exceeding pre-invasion levels. The ban was extended to refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil processed in third countries, with exceptions for allies such as the US, UK, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. 
• Price caps: The EU, in coordination with G7 partners, has enforced price caps on Russian seaborn crude, as well as on “premium-to-crude” and “discount-to-crude” petroleum products. The cap was recently lowered to remain below market price, with a new automatic review mechanism ensuring it stays punitive. 
• Enforcement at sea: Hundreds of vessels linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” have been denied EU port access and services. The blacklist grows with each new sanctions package. 
• Gas and LNG: Gas has been harder to target than oil, but the EU has imposed a patchwork of measures. These include a ban on future EU investments in new Russian LNG projects, prohibitions on LNG transshipment in EU ports, and restrictions on imports of LNG into certain terminals. Russian entities are also barred from booking EU gas storage capacity. 
• Technology, investment, and infrastructure: The EU prohibits exports of refining technologies, exploration software, and other services vital to Russia’s energy sector. All new EU investments in Russian energy are banned, with narrow carve-outs for civil nuclear cooperation. Transactions linked to Nord Stream 1 and 2 are fully prohibited. 

The 19th sanctions package: LNG in the crosshairs 

Negotiations are underway for a 19th package of sanctions. The Commission presented its proposal to EU Member States in September, at the height of Washington’s pressure for the EU to accelerate its phase-out of Russian LNG and punish third countries still doing business with Moscow. 

At its core, the package proposes a full ban on Russian LNG imports by January 2027, a year earlier than the Commission had envisioned in the REPowerEU legislative proposal it tabled right before the summer. The package also proposes expanding anti-circumvention measures, adding over 100 shadow-fleet vessels to the blacklist and targeting Chinese and Indian firms involved in Russian energy trade. 

The Commission had hoped to push the measures through quickly, with Washington pressing Hungary and Slovakia to fall in line. But divisions remain, both on the energy aspects of the package as well as on the financial ones. Sanctions require unanimity, and Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico has already demanded that the discussion be escalated to EU leaders at the October European Council, slowing progress. Hungary has, this time, softened under US pressure, leaving Slovakia as the main obstacle.

As in previous rounds, the timing and which measures will ultimately make it into the final package remain difficult to predict. A deal could come together unexpectedly, but many are looking to the EU leaders’ meeting on 23 October for a possible denouement.

Beyond sanctions: locking in energy decoupling through law and tariffs 

Sanctions are temporary instruments that must be renewed every six months. With the war approaching its fourth year, the EU is now moving to entrench energy decoupling through legislation and trade measures that cannot be undone so easily. 

On 6 May 2025, the Commission presented its REPowerEU Roadmap, a nine-step plan to eliminate the EU’s remaining dependence on Russian fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Several legislative proposals were promised; only one has been tabled so far, but that hasn’t stopped EU capitals from pressing their positions in anticipation. 

Gas phase-out 

In July, the Commission followed through on the gas component of REPowerEU by proposing a law to ban all Russian gas imports, targeting both pipeline gas and LNG. Unlike sanctions, this ban would be permanent and could only be amended through a new legislative act under the ordinary procedure. 

Parliament and Council are now shaping their positions. The main differences concern the timeline, scope, and emergency clause. 

• On timing, the Parliament is pushing for a faster phase-out than proposed by the Commission and largely backed by the Council.   
• On scope, MEPs want to extend the ban to Russian oil imports, closing remaining sanction exemptions that allow Hungary and Slovakia to continue pipeline imports of Russian oil. However, most governments oppose merging sanctions and legislative measures, warning that it could create legal and political complications.  
• On the review clause, the Council supports keeping a narrowly defined suspension mechanism that could be triggered in case of an energy supply crisis. MEPs, by contrast, want to remove it entirely, arguing it would weaken the credibility of the ban and create uncertainty for companies seeking to exit Russian contracts.  

The European Parliament and the Council are expected to finalise their positions by 16 and 20 October respectively, with inter-institutional negotiations likely to begin shortly after and a final deal targeted before the end of the year. 

Nuclear phase-out 

The REPowerEU roadmap also foresees measures to end imports of Russian nuclear fuel. A legislative proposal is expected to target enriched uranium and new contracts with Russian suppliers, while supporting the development of alternative EU supply chains. Resistance is strong: Hungary and Slovakia, both dependent on Russian-designed reactors, argue the plan endangers their energy security. Prime Minister Robert Fico recently dismissed the proposal as “the biggest danger” for the EU, signalling a difficult political battle ahead.  

Because this would take the form of legislation, unanimity is not required, but no date has yet been set for its presentation. 

Tariffs on Russian oil  

In parallel, the Commission is preparing a proposal to impose tariffs on Russian crude. Here again, unlike sanctions, tariffs fall under EU trade law and can be adopted by qualified majority, giving Brussels a way to bypass potential vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia, the two Member States still importing Russian oil. No timeline has been announced. 

An unfinished break 

The EU’s struggle to end its reliance on Russian energy is unfolding under the shadow of Washington. President Trump has simultaneously chastised Europe for continuing to import Russian fuel while pressing it to buy more American exports. His pressure has made once-taboo steps, such as banning Russian gas outright, seem more politically feasible in Brussels. Yet his demand that the EU mirror Washington’s tougher line on third countries like China and India, accused of benefitting from the war, puts Brussels in a difficult position and adds another layer of complexity.  

Nearly four years into the war, Europe has made undeniable progress in curbing its exposure to Russian energy blackmailing but hasn’t managed to significantly curb the billions of euros it feeds into the Putin’s wartime economy.  

New measures on the table could expand the scope and commit the EU’s phase-out into permanence. Yet political fractures inside the EU, reinforced by external pressure, continue to test the Union’s resolve. The next months will bring crucial decisions: whether to add all Russian LNG imports to the EU’s sanctions regime, legislate the timeline for the full gas phase-out, and advance yet-to-be proposed texts on oil tariffs and nuclear fuel. Taken together, these will show whether Europe can finally deliver on its ambition to end energy dependence on Russia. 

Image source: EC – Audiovisual Service